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The state of international society in the 1960's may be described as
atavistic. After the defeat of the Axis in 1945, a renewed hope for world order
emerged at the San Francisco Conference with a naive belief in big power
co-operation.' But some forty armed conflicts have occurred during the last
20 years,2 even though the states of the world, in adhering to the United Na-
tions Charter, renounced the use of force for the settling of international
disputes. The United Nations security system and mechanisms for policing the
world have broken up on the shoals of big power rivalry and the frustrated
strivings of new nations.
The United States, the world power standing for an established order and
the ideals of democracy, has a vested interest and obligation in the promotion of
a world legal order. But it has tended to abjure this obligation by its resort
to armed force in Viet Nam. Legal scholars have seriously questioned the
legality of American involvement, though there are equally sincere advocates of
the American position.' The role of a world policeman was given to the United
Nations at San Francisco, but some commentators have maintained that the
United States has now assumed this task.4 To many, particularly North
Viet Nam, the United States appears as the aggressor. Moreover, the American
people are unlikely to support such a continuing role for the United States.
Furthermore, as was demonstrated by the inability of the United States to act
in the Middle East in the spring and summer of 1967, involvement in one area
prevents effective action elsewhere.
When the United States fails to set an effective example for the upholding
of international order, it is understandable that the newly emerging states, less
concerned with notions of legality, would be more inclined to view the norms
of international order with contempt. In Africa, despite the adoption of the
Genocide Convention, mass murder is being perpetrated in the Congo, in Nigeria
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and in the Sudan.5 A form of political gangsterism has been applied with
the kidnappings of Moise Tshombe and Ben Bella.6 Poison gas has been ap-
plied in Yemen.' Further contributing to international anarchy has been the
decline in the prestige of the International Court of Justice after its refusal to
decide the merits of the Southwest Africa case.'
Most indicative of the breakdown of world order has been the failure of
the United Nations system to resolve the Palestine question, a matter on which
the Security Council and General Assembly have devoted more time than on
any other issue. In 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution for the
partition of Palestine, but despite this decision of the international community,
Arab armies invaded Palestine.9 The United Nations failed to take effective
police action, and its prestige was salvaged only by the victory of Israeli forces.
Some prestige was regained with the stationing of contingents of a United
Nations Emergency Force in Sinai, the Gaza strip and at the Straits of Tiran
following the Suez crisis in 1957. But this prestige was dissipated by the with-
drawal of these forces in May of 1967." Despite the clearly announced inten-
tions of the Arab states to destroy Israel and to commit a new crime of genocide,
the United Nations failed to act to prevent the subsequent war. Security Council
action was paralyzed by the prospects of a Soviet veto, while unilateral action
by the United States in the capacity of a world policeman was precluded by
involvement in Viet Nam. The Soviet Union, which should act as a responsible
world power, had cynically aided and abetted in planning the pending act of
genocide by providing the Arab states with extensive arms, though the Western
nations did not emerge with clean hands. An act of genocide was again avoided
only by an Israeli victory. But the Soviet Union, instead of seeking to promote a
peaceful resolution of this conflict, has proceeded to rearm the Arab states.
Elements of justice exist with both contenders in the Palestine dispute. But
these matters can only be resolved through negotiation and adjudication. The
international community cannot condone genocide, the goals sought by Arab
5 Troeller and Deffarge, Slaughter in Africa, ATLAS, Oct., 1967, at 14.
6 Politik auf Gangster-Art: Menschenraub!, BUNTE ILLUSTRIERTE, Sept. 6, 1967, at 28.
7 113 CoNG. REc. S11364 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1967) (text of Red Cross report).
8 See Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal 21 INTL ORG. 1 (1967);
Friedmann, The Jurisprudential Implications of the Southwest Africa Case, 6 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1967); Higgins, The International Court and Southwest Africa, The Im-
plications of the Judgment, 42 INT'L AFF. 573 (1966).
9 T. LIE, IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE 158-73 (1954).
10 As Abba Eban stated, "The United Nations was revealed, unfortunately, at the very
lowest depths of incapacity in the Middle East itself; it fled from the arena like a fire brigade
at the first smell of smoke." 113 CONG. REc. H14305-06 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1967) (Address
of Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel, to National Press Club).
Colonel Jonas Waern, who had been commander of U.N. Swedish battalions in the
Congo and Cyprus, has commented: "We who have served with United Nations peacekeeping
forces in troubled areas of the world regarded the withdrawal of U.N. troops from the Gaza
region during the Arab-Israeli crisis as a great failure and defeat." He acknowledges that
the Secretary-General may have had sound legal reasons for withdrawing the forces, but
objects to the one-sidedness of the termination which meant that ten years of work and self-
sacrifice had come to nothing. The very use of U.N. military assignments was questioned.
The proposal is made for the establishment of a U.N. command rather than making use of
peace-keeping contingents from different countries. Waern, Diary of a U.N. Peacekeeper,
SATuRDAY REviEw, Nov. 18, 1967, at 19.
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rulers." Such acts can only mean the destruction of world order. But the world
community has proven incapable of action. Nations mouth moralisms on behalf
of international law and order but ignore these norms when they conflict with
their interests. As U. N. Secretary-General U Thant has despairingly ob-
served: "International morals have degenerated ... general morals, like good
behavior and live and let live. As far as those things are concerned, we're
still in the Middle Ages .. . [and] things are getting worse." 2
Under the aegis of this attitude lies the path to thermonuclear annihilation.
The leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union have admitted
that there can be no victors in another war. Human society as presently known
could not survive. Clearly a radical innovation is needed to mobilize the con-
science of mankind and revive the world order. Such an approach can be
buttressed in the formation of an ad hoc International War Crimes Tribunal
-within the framework of the United Nations. The imperatives of the inter-
national situation are such that the implementation of such an entity must
be more than mere idle speculation.
A permanent ad hoc International War Crimes Tribunal, the special object
of its concern being the deterrence and punishment of the crime of genocide,
would serve a dual purpose:
(1) It would act prophylactically to deter war crimes by providing an
authoritative institution through which the moral and political force of the
world could be focused against a criminal. The threatened or harmed in-
dividual, group, or nation could present its case under conditions that would
afford the publicity of a fair trial with an unquestioned just decision. The taint
of partiality in the punishment which attended the trials of Nazi war criminals
would be banished if the court were the expression of a continuing universal
consensus as to the criminality of the- acts indicted and punished.
(2) More important perhaps than providing established procedure for the
trial of war criminals, the court would clarify and expand the substantive law
of war crimes and thus increase that area of international agreement through
which war crimes may ultimately be suppressed. The court would be a per-
manent meeting place in which an already existing consensus could be for-
malized and expressed in decisions having the force of international law. At
the same time it would allow negotiation and agreement among the powers
as to the scope of the rights and duties they may demand from each other.
The ultimate aim of such a tribunal would be to establish in the public
consciousness as well as in the law of nations the criminality of certain acts and
the great principle, announced by the Nuremberg Tribunal and unanimously
affirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, that individual liability
for war crimes may be imposed despite the defenses of "act of state" and
superior orders.
II Hourani expresses similar sentiments in noting the Arab failure to seek the containment
rather than destruction of Israel. Hourani, The Moment of Truth, ENCOUNTER, Nov., 1967,
at 3.
12 Editorial, ATLAS, Oct., 1967, at 7. The cynicism of the states of the Soviet bloc in
its championing of the Arab attacks was pointed up by the dramatic action of the Czech
writer, Ladislav Mnacko, in speaking out and in visiting Israel, CoNoRss BI-WEEKLY, Sept.
25, 1967, at 15.
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"While these principles have been accepted in international law, they have
not evolved into rules of conduct. The problem in the prevention of war crimes
is to inscribe these rules on the public consciousness so that a perpetual- external
enforcement of them will be unnecessary. In principle, war crimes should be
regarded by the peoples of the world much as they regard incest, i.e, they should
be so universally condemned that no law would be needed for deterrence.
Social force and the individual conscience would, on the whole, suffice. If any-
one suspects that such a condition cannot be reached, let him ask himself if he
imagines that the rate of incest in the United States would skyrocket tomorrow
if the sanctions making such conduct criminal were removed from the statute
books. A better example, perhaps is the actual outlawing of a particular war
crime-by the Tauregs of North Africa. These people, living under conditions
of the most severe scarcity of water, have learned over the course of years
that the poisoning of wells is a war crime. However bitter their internecine
strife, they will not allow it. If a party engages in it, all will abandon him and
even turn upon him, so great is the degree of consensus over the heinousness
of his act.
The law concerning war crimes would be enveloped within the superego
of individuals. The existence of a war crimes tribunal would tend to reinforce
the superego. Though the law must enlist the aid of the superego to maintain
order, the law also strengthens the superego.'" The rule of law does not find
its authority in a command or a sanction, but is based on the recognition that
it is obligatory, the recognition that we are bound by it." This recognition
could be instilled by an international tribunal.
Thomas Hobbes, who had a perceptive insight into the nature of man,
perceived that while man has a restless desire for power, the quest for leisure
and repose have also led to civil disobedience. To Hobbes, the three principal
causes for quarrel were competition, diffidence and glory, while fear consigns
men to peace. While in the state of nature each man has a right to everything,
a fundamental law of nature as derived from reason is peace, which is necessary
for survival. Therefore, certain rights were transferred to a sovereign authority
by contract, thereby constituting the basis of political authority 5 Today, sur-
vival and the need for peace require states as sovereign entities to transfer cer-
tain rights to an international body. The same fear which forced man to give
up certain of his rights to a sovereign state now requires granting certain of the
rights of the sovereign state to a supernational authority.
As yet, world opinion on war crimes has not reached this self-governing
stage. The people of the world have only imperfectly internationalized the notion
that such conduct must not be allowed and that, if it does occur, even those
taking orders may be held responsible. Creating preconditions for the inter-
nationalization of the law is properly the function of some authoritative insti-
tution, one that can determine the law and state it without ambiguity, one that
can punish with the utmost public attention. This article will demonstrate that
13 Schoenfeld, The Superego's Influence on the Law, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 299 (1965).
14 Goodhart, supra note 2, at 774.
15 T. HoBBEs, THE LEVIATHAN 99-109 (1951).
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such a body would represent not an impractical innovation, but the logical out-
come of our country's trends in international jurisprudence, and that such a
body is especially needed at the present moment. Lastly, this argument will
undertake to show that the tribunal should be a part of the peace-keeping ap
paratus of the United Nations. No new surrender of national sovereignty by
treaty or other means would be necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the
proposed permanent war crimes tribunal. It would only be necessary that men
generally agree that war crimes should no longer be a subject of only oc-
casional justice.
II. The Growth of the Concept of the War Crime
The notion of war crimes emerged prior to World War II, though far
more extensive publicity was given to its war crime trials than to any previous
trials of war criminals. From quite early times, states have punished violations
of the laws of war, whether committed by their own troops or by the enemy;
and the concept of laws of war has precedent at least as far back as the medieval
period. One thinks of the illegitimacy of fighting on the Sabbath, of the rules
of chivalry, and the conception of knightly behavior as embodying the obligation
to manifest moral values even on the battlefield. The peculiar contribution
of our age lies not in the formulation of laws of warfare, but in the creation of
institutions and procedures by which sanctions might be applied in lieu of the
universal sanctions once possessed by the Church.
The precursor to the notion of war crimes may be found in the concept
of a just war which had its roots in the practice of Greece and Rome. In Rome,
the justness of waging a war was decided by the priest or fetiales.'0 The concept
was revived by St. Augustine who firmly approved participation in war if the
purpose of the war was just, such as to avenge injury and suffering.'7 To
Thomas Aquinas a war was just if authorized by the prince; the other party
was to be fought against because of some guilt of his own; and the belligerent
was possessed of the right intention to promote good and avoid evil."8 To the
Scholastics, a war could only be just on one side, which side had all the rights
of warfare, including the right to kill prisoners.'" The Spanish Scholastic,
Vittoria, applied the concept of just war with regard to, the Indians whose
paganism was excused because of ignorance, but whose resistance to missionaries
was not to be permitted." Gentili was the first to recognize that a war may be
objectively just on both sides." Grotius subsequently adopted these concepts,
stressing tolerance with no distinction made as to infidels. However, he in-
cluded private wars in his concept. 22 Later writers thought that the justness of
a war had no relationship to the consequences of its legal effects. More recently,
16 A. NUSBAUm, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 10 (2 ed. 1961).
17 Id. at 35.
18 Id. at 36-37.
19 Id. at 37-38.
20 Id. at 80.
21 Id. at 95.
22 Id. at 107.
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the maintenance of a balance of power has been related to the just war concept.
To the Soviets, a war is just if it serves the interests of the proletariat."
The nineteenth century concept of the unqualifiedly equal legality of bel-
ligerents almost made the just war concept disappear. This resulted from the
insistence upon state sovereignty and the absence of any human authority that
could finally declare where justice lay. According to Vattel, to pass judgment
on acts of states constituted a violation of sovereignty.24 However, the effort to
check war's inhumanity by rules governing the commencement and conduct of
hostilities achieved a number of documentary successes and practical results
culminating in the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and later in the
Nuremberg Trial of 1946."
Most commonly, jurisdiction in modern times in cases of crimes that we
would now call "against humanity" is justified on one of two grounds. Either
it is said to be founded on a theory of natural law or it is posited on the same
basis as the universal jurisdiction over pirates, i.e., crimes against the species
as a whole may be punished by whoever has the power.2 Paradoxically, while
in personam jurisdiction over war criminals in our age was first partially justi-
fied by reference to these old cases involving pirates, it is now true that jurisdic-
tion over war criminals is far better established in international custom and
consent than jurisdiction over pirates ever was." The man who was a pirate in
the view of one sovereign may have been a privateer with letters of marque
from another. Our age, on the other hand, is notable for its examples of en-
tirely unjustifiable brutality, crimes against humanity without any cover of law.
In the generation before World War I, a growing concern for developing
international order manifested itself in a variety of treaties and conferences, the
most famous of which was the meeting at the Hague in 1907. The violation of
a sense of world order by criminal acts on the part of the Central Powers in
World War I led to the inclusion of Articles 227 and 228 in the Versailles
Treaty. In Article 227, the Allies undertook to appoint one judge from each
of their nations to a special tribunal for the purpose of trying the Kaiser. This
court was to vindicate "the highest obligations of international undertakings
and the validity of international morality."28 Although the plan was doomed
with the refusal of Holland to surrender the defendant, it was significant be-
cause an international responsibility for war crimes was found to lie upon a
head of state, and the doctrine of act of state was not regarded as a prima facie
defense.
In Article 228, it was provided that "the German Government recognizes
the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals
persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs
23 Id. at 287-88.
24 P. CORBETr, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES 211 (1951).
25 See generally Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REV.
177 (1945).
26 Id. at 182.
27 Id. at 185.
28 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties (Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference), 14 Am. J. INT'L L. 95
(1920).
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of war." For political reasons, however, the Allies saw fit to delegate the
enforcement of that right to the highest German court, which held twelve trials,
with only half the defendants found guilty. A principle to be of the greatest
importance a generation later was enunciated by this German court in the
case of the naval officers Boldt and Dithmar who received four years imprison-
ment for firing upon the survivors in lifeboats of a British hospital ship. The
officers' defense that their superior, the U-boat commander, had ordered the
atrocity was held unavailing, and they were held personally liable for having
obeyed an order patently in violation of the laws of war"
The next stage in the expansion of war crimes doctrine came in 1945 with
the conclusion of an agreement among Britain, the United States, and the
U.S.S.R. to try jointly those war criminals whose offenses were without particu-
lar geographical localization."0 In that document, the Nuremberg Charter, war
crimes were specified to include the murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war
or of persons on the seas, the killing of hostages, the plunder of property, and
all devastation not justifiable as militarily necessary. In addition to these tradi-
tional categories, two new classes were included: (1) crimes against the peace,
consisting in "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any
of the foregoing"; and (2) crimes against humanity, consisting in "murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population before or during the war or persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in violation of
domestic law of the country where perpetrated .... "I' -
In its judgment,12 the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, established
by the tri-partite agreement, pointed to certain precedents in defense of its juris-
diction that are relevant to the legitimacy of a war crimes tribunal at the present
time. The court noted that the Germans, like practically all other civilized
nations, had bound themselves to the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact of 1928. By the former, the signatories had renounced the
stated categories of violations of the rules of war; by the latter, the signatories,
of whom there were sixty-three, bound themselves to renounce war. This
latter agreement was held by the court to have given to aggressive war the char-
acter of a crime in the international community. With regard to the jurisdiction
of an international tribunal over individuals, the court rejected the older doc-
trine that natural persons can never be subjects of international law.3 Reference
was made to Ex parte Quirin,34 wherein the Supreme Court of the United States
had assigned individual liability to foreign saboteurs captured on American
29 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, DEPT. op STATE BULL., Aug. 12, 1945, at 222.
30 Id. at 423.
31 Id. at 224.
32 Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), judgment and
Sentences, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947).
33 Id. at 174.
34 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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soil for actions committed by those saboteurs in violation of the laws of war.
The true test, the judgment concluded, was not the existence of an order but
whether moral choice was in fact possible.
The tribunal was established for the sole purpose of trying the war crim-
inals of the Axis countries. The Charter removed from the jurisdiction of the
tribunal any consideration of Allied war criminals, who were to be tried by the
military courts of their own governments. Hence, notwithstanding its name,
the tribunal was not an international court established to try international, crimes
but an Allied court established to try Nazis. 5 The proceedings contained an
element of hypocrisy in that the tribunal contained representatives from the
Soviet Union which had been a co-conspirator in the initiation of the war.
Moreover, an estimated 45 to 85 million people had been murdered or elim-
inated as a result of the Russian Revolution.
3
6
The objectives of the Nuremberg trials were: (1) to carry out a major
war aim of the Allies that major war criminals be brought to justice with sen-
tences to be given according to the law and the evidence before the tribunal;
(2) to exemplify the possibility of co-operation among the great powers; (3) to
give the world a historical record of what happened in Germany during the
fifteen years from 1930 to 1945; (4) to give an example of a fair trial; and
(5) to contribute to the development of international law by applying the law
of the Nuremberg Charter.3" The significance of the trials lay in their focusing
upon individual responsibility. The court did not focus only upon the indi-
vidual who waged aggressive war, but also upon the individual who formulated
national policies and participated in the preparation of war. The concept of
conspiracy was thus formulated, and precedent may furnish the foundation for
the United Nations to take positive steps when it concludes there is a prima facie
case of conspiracy.3
It should be realized that while the international military tribunal render-
ing this judgment derived its powers from the charter authorizing its existence,
the principles expressed in the Charter of the Nuremberg tribunal and the
judgment itself were affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 11, 1946.'9 At the same time (the period 1945-46) the many trials,
both in Europe and Asia, of war criminals as initiators of aggression affirmed
a similar doctrine.40 The Resolution of December 11, 1946, also denounced
genocide as an international crime and, on December 9, 1948, the General
Assembly adopted a convention on that question, defining genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
35 Note, Nuremberg Trials, 24 U. PTT. L. REv. 73, 77 (1962).
36 E. LYoNs, WORKERS' PARADISE LoST 6 (1967).
37 Wright, The Nuremberg Trial, 246 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. AND Soc. Sc. 72-80
(1964).
38 Doman, The Political Consequences of the Nuremberg Trial, 246 ANNALS AM.
ACADEMY POL. AND SOC. SC. 81 (1964).
39 1 U.N. GAOR 1144 (1946).
40 Walkinshaw, The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials: Another Step Toward International
justice, 35 A.B.AJ. 299 (1949); Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, 62 LAw
Q. REv. 40 (1946).
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(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group._41
Conspiracy to commit genocide is punishable under the convention, as
are attempts, incitement, if direct and public, and all complicity. By article
VI persons charged with the enumerated acts are to be tried by a competent
tribunal in the state in which the offense was committed or by such interna-
tional tribunal as may have jurisdiction through an agreement of the parties
to accept its jurisdiction. Under article VII the enumerated crimes are not to
be regarded as political crimes for the purpose of extradition, and all signatories
pledge themselves to grant extradition in accordance with existing laws and
treaties. Significantly, when the Soviet Union suggested deletion of the reference
to an international penal tribunal, the proposal was voted down thirty-eight
to eight.
4 2
A court approaching the conception of an international tribunal for pro-
tecting human rights came into existence in 1953 when the fifteen states of the
Council of Europe created the European Court of Human Rights and with it
the Commission of Human Rights empowered to hear complaints from natural
persons, groups, and member nations. The International War Crimes Tribunal
proposed by this paper would seek in part to universalize the notion of such a
court and to direct its attention specifically to the class of violations of human
dignity that has caused the greatest suffering in our century.
III. The Present Need for the Tribunal
The summary above demonstrates the evolution of the attitude of the
international community regarding the treatment of war crimes. Early in this
century, states formally abjured certain acts during war (the Hague Conven-
tion of 1907). By 1919, the commission of these acts was regarded as punish-
able by an international tribunal. Furthermore, liability for these acts was seen
to extend to individuals (even to heads of states) and to supersede the doctrine
of act of state. Finally, in the present phase, as indicated by the Genocide Con-
vention, a large part of world opinion is ready to accept a permanent interna-
tional tribunal with jurisdiction over war crimes.
Such a tribunal would serve urgent purposes. It would serve to clarify
this most important branch of international law. The tribunal, being free of
the constitutional limitations that prevent our Supreme Court from rendering
advisory opinions, would be able to refine and make lucid the present body of
41 G.A. Rns. 260 (I1) A, 3 U.N. GAOR Res. 1948, at 174.
42 Id. at 175. There were also eight abstentions.
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war crime law upon authoritative request, e.g., that of the General Assembly.
Presently, the elements necessary to establish a war crime are not always explicit.
The enumerated acts section of the Genocide Convention illustrates this. The
Convention, for example, purports to make criminal an attempt to destroy in
whole or in part a "group" but it does not refer, inter alia, to the role of the
defenses of insanity and impossibility. Does the Convention, taken as an ex-
pression of world opinion, mean that a man, who attempting to shoot all
Negroes, mildly wounds one, is guilty of attempted genocide? If insanity is a
defense would it be taken to excuse the Nazis, some of whom may have been
clinically insane? If the crime of genocide is taken to include the conspiracy
- without overt action - to cause "serious bodily or mental harm," then a
few men who band together to insult certain of their neighbors because their
neighbors are members of a "group," are guilty of genocide. The section out-
lawing measures intended to prevent births is quite ambiguous if cut loose from
the experience of involuntary sterilization during the Second World War. Taken
literally, it might indict the distribution of contraceptives by the United States
Army in Viet Nam.
These questions, of course, cannot be answered by a statute. It is the busi-
ness of courts to expand the common law of war crimes and for that reason the
necessity of a permanent court for war crimes is manifest. The clarification
of these questions is not an academic exercise, but is the first step toward the
creation of a common understanding of the obligations of international life. It
is precisely such agreement on who owes what to whom, what X or Y means,
that forms the underpinnings of a system of law. Such agreement is most easily
brought about by an institution that is both a focal point for debate and an
authoritative source of decisions.
A problem to be considered by a war crimes tribunal would be the appli-
cation of the principle of military necessity. Belligerents are obliged to follow
the internationally recognized rules of war with military necessity a defense
for violation, such as self-preservation. The underlying principle is that no more
force or violence should be used to undertake a military action than is absolutely
necessary. The doctrine was clarified in a number of cases at Nuremberg, such
as those holdings forbidding the killing of unarmed enemies or the use of mass
deportations. 3 Today, the problem is particularly acute in light of the avail-
ability of weapons of mass destruction. The proposed tribunal should be obliged
to determine whether the use or threatened use of such weapons may be justified,
whether in a state of war or cold war.
At the moment, violations of the laws and customs of war occupy a prom-
inent place in our newspapers. It is common knowledge that during the recent
hostilities in the Middle East, official radio facilities of certain Arab governments
spoke of the intention of these states to exterminate the Israelis. At the same
time, photographs and reports by neutral observers demonstrated the use of
poison gas by Egyptian air forces against the civilian population of Yemen.
43 Mashaw, Federal Issues in and about the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1965); Schwelb, The Protection of the Right
of Property of Nationals under the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights, 13 Am. J. CoMp. L. 518 (1964).
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Finally, the presence and character of the American involvement in Viet Nam
is increasingly questioned. Bertrand Russell, for one, has called it criminal."
The deterrent effect, both moral and political, of the war crimes trials of our
century has been dissipated for the want of a permanent body capable of de-
fining the extent of the concept of the war crime and moving legally against
mutual instances of war crimes. In the absence of such a body, private indi-
viduals like Russell are forced to resort to what the common law would call
self-help. Clearly, however, such measures can not bear the moral or the legal
impact of determinations by an international tribunal functioning with the
general consent of the world community and under the auspices of the United
Nations. Assuming that the United States may have committed acts in Viet Nam
which constitute war crimes, the Russell tribunal may have had before it evidence
that established this fact. But the obvious political purpose of the body and the
stated prejudices of its members prevented the assurance of an objective decision.
It is self-evident that those who wish to try American actions as well as those who
wish to defend them require an impartial judge; for without the assurance of
impartiality, neither a conviction nor an acquittal carries much weight.
A most important case for such a tribunal would be the issue of the un-
resolved war in the Middle East. The Arab states have continuously made
known to the world their intent to commit acts illegal under the definitions of
war crimes given in this article. 5 The war is still under way, though presently
quiescent, and the danger of the commission of war crimes -even genocide -
is very real. An expression of will on the part of the majority of the world's
people, acting through the United Nations, could forestall such crimes. If it
were understood by the Arab powers that criminal acts would be judged by
the United Nations and punished by the concerted force of the great powers,
then one suspects that war crimes in the area would be effectively deterred.46
Much the same can be said of other chief examples of manifest intent to
violate the principles of the Resolution of December 11, 1946. On the whole,
these cases involve small nations whose acts the United Nations might realis-
tically hope to influence through moral and political suasion. The typical ex-
ample might be the African state pieced together after colonial liberations from
various hostile tribes or religious groups. The prevention of war crimes during
civil hostilities in such states-such as those now taking place in Nigeria with
regard to the Ibo tribe- will prove to be a major concern in the diplomacy
of the remainder of our century, and a permanent war crimes tribunal would
44 See Hook, Lord Russell and the War Crimes "Trial," 112 CONG. REc. A5866 (daily ed.
Nov. 21, 1966).
45 113 CONG. REc. A3675-6 (daily ed. July 20, 1967); 113 CONG. REc. H9643-6 (daily
ed. July 31, 1967); 113 CONG. REc. S11275-86 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1967).
46 Jewish residents in Arab countries have been subjected to oppressions somewhat
verging on genocide. The Syrian regime has set up a 2.4 mile radius beyond which the Jews
of the Damascus Ghetto may not venture. Telephones are tapped and mail is censored. Jews
are banned from buying land or dealing in imports. In Egypt, 500 Jews were arrested and
crammed into tiny cells with many detainees beaten and tortured. In Iraq, 100 Jewish leaders
were arrested while the entire community is under house arrest. Though North African
governments sought to protect their Jews, the Jewish community was subjected to mob
harassment and many have been forced to flee. Exodus, NEWSWEEk, Nov. 27, 1967, at 57-58.
Israel's Chief Rabbinate has issued a passionate appeal to the conscience of the world to act
in favor of the Jews in Arab lands. THE ISRAEL DIGEST, Oct. 20, 1967, at 5.
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offer at least a first step in bringing that problem under control. At the same
time, it is likely that there will be an escalation in the frequency and severity
of external conflicts in the Third World, generally comprising the developing
nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Permanent sources of conflict lie
not only in tribal and racial conflict, but also in the traditional causes of war
between nations: ideological conflict, clashes over contested real estate (Kash-
mir), and self-aggrandisement at the expense of others (India's occupation of
Goa).
The post-war world has witnessed a simultaneous diffusion in the under-
developed world of the most hateful products of the industrial West: militaristic
nationalism and advanced military technology. Political systems of a relatively
primitive order now possess helicopters, poison gas, napalm, airplanes, and
fragmentation bombs. It is unlikely that they will use them more wisely than
do the "advanced" countries. The frightful atrocities committed in 1966 in
Indonesia against the resident Chinese indicate the potential for genocidal and
war crimes that exists in the Third World.
At all previous stages of this century's movement toward a criminal law
among nations, opponents of this movement and those honestly concerned with
the viability of legal doctrine have objected to the application of legal sanctions
on the ground that such punishments are ex post facto and violate the principle
forbidding retroactive application of criminal law. While this principle is of
some theoretical importance, it has not been a practical barrier to the prosecu-
tion of war criminals. Germans prior to the Second World War, for example,
were bound not merely by custom and agreement but also by article 38 of the
International Court, which regarded acts as criminal if they violated funda-
mental principles of justice recognized by civilized nations. Concerning the
future, however, it is certainly desirable to extinguish any trace of ambiguity
lingering in the concept of the war crime in order to deprive all violators every-
where of the defense that they lacked sufficient notice of the law to conform
their behavior to its demands. This function is difficult for a parliamentary
body to perform. It requires a revision of the concept of the war crime in ac-
cordance with changing circumstances. It is properly the work of a commis-
sion of trained jurists.
IV. The Form and Functioning of the Tribunal
Article VI of the Genocide Convention contemplates lodging jurisdiction
in courts of two kinds: competent tribunals in the state where the offense was
committed and such international tribunals as the contracting parties shall
accept as having jurisdiction. It may be that no further conferring of juris-
diction is necessary. The essential question is whether the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction over war criminals has not already been accepted. That doctrine
was advanced by the judgment unanimously affirmed by the General Assembly
on December 11, 1946," and it was advanced again by Israel during the debate
47 1 U.N. GAOR 1144 (1946); Finch, The Nuremberg Trial, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 20
(1947).
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on the propriety of Israeli jurisdiction over Adolf Eichmann. 8 In the latter
case, the General Assembly did not rebut the Israeli reading of the law, but
instead resolved that people in all countries wished Eichmann brought to appro-
priate justice.,9
The crimes that may be punished by any state (or at least by any member
of the United Nations), including genocide, are limited to the crimes punished
at Nuremberg and piracy. The internationality of jurisdiction over the first
two is established by resolution; that of the third is a product of custom and
as such is of some doubt. The Israeli court in the Eichmann trial .addressed
itself to the trial provision in article VI of the Genocide Convention and found
it to grant a nonexclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, it would abridge all common
principles of construction to interpret the convention as having repealed by
implication the bases of jurisdiction existing before 1948. These bases, com-
monly called the nationality and protective or passive personality principles,
allow a state to claim jurisdiction over its nationals who commit offenses abroad
and over nationals of other states who commit wrongs against its own popu-
lation, whether on its territory or not. To the Eichmann court, the trial was
justified not merely by the principle of universal jurisdiction over war crimes
but also by the doctrine of protective jurisdiction. The court maintained that
while the Jewish state had not been in existence at the time of Eichmann's
crimes, that state was the embodiment of the Jewish Nation against which
Eichmann's crimes had in fact been committed. As such, the court held, it had
the power to punish his crimes.5"
Before Eichmann, the protective principle had justified only what might
be called the protective jurisdiction of incorporated groups, i.e., nation-states.
It made no provision for the protection of persecuted internal minorities, or of
such minorities who have at a later time formed themselves into a separate state.
The Genocide Convention, by its broad use of language, does make provision
for such cases and provides a rationale for the exercise of jurisdiction in them.
In doing so, it expands the concept of the war crime, making the term one of
legal art. Under the convention, the existence of civil or external hostility is
no longer a prerequisite for commission of crimes punishable as against the
laws and customs of nations. If we wish to describe these crimes as war crimes
without "war," it will be no stranger than saying that "malice aforethought"
has with the passage of time come to signify certain states of mind punishable
when found existing with homicide and may have nothing to do with malice
or premeditation. Throughout this paper the term "war crime" has been used
for the sake of uniformity and convenience, but Eichmann should make clear
that genocide and war crimes are both examples of crimes against humanity
and a.e criminal under the principles of the Nuremberg judgment.
48 Note, Eichmann-Internatonal Law?, 24 U. PrrT. L. REV. 116 (1962).
49 The authorities are in conflict, however, over whether piracy is an international
criane .... A study of the few materials in point suggests that the [Israeli] court's
conclusion that the universality principle covers Eichmann's crimes is substantially
accurate, though admittedly the sources are insufficient to establish this conclusion




This is as it must be. The older authorities regarded war crimes as arising
from the activities of one state against another, and crimes under such circum-
stances are penal under the protective and nationality principles."' But modem
warfare has created the possibility of the extermination of the entire external
enemy or some internal minority. If the Arab forces in the recently concluded
war had succeeded in their avowed intention to destroy the whole population
of Israel, the older principles of international law would be unable to furnish
a forum. Thus, the trial provisions of the Genocide Convention provide for
two kinds of trials: trials in the state in which the offense was committed, and
trials by an international court whose jurisdiction has been accepted by the
States. The first situation prima facie must look to the fall of a government
and the surrender of its officers either to foreigners whom they have abused or
to the courts of the new government. The second situation insures that a forum
may exist even in the case of successful mass murder. In this respect, interna-
tional law before the convention and the two resolutions that preceded it, may
be thought of as looking to damage, rather than the possibility of extermination,
to tort, rather than to homicide. The situation is rather like that which pre-
vailed in common-law jurisdictions prior to the enactment of wrongful death
acts. At that time, it was safer to kill a man than to hurt him through one's
negligence. Unless universality of jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated in
the Nuremberg and Genocide resolutions is recognized, one might say that the
same situation prevails in the international community, and that it is safer to
exterminate a nation than merely to attack it.
For such an international tribunal to be effective it must apply norms and
principles within the context of the realities of international life. A moralistic
posture must be eschewed. For example, in determining what constitutes
aggression or a justified resort to force under article 5 of the United Nations
Charter, it must not apply a mechanistic formula, but must consider the con-
text of the particular situation.52 Such an approach would be similar to that
of applying notions of due process in American courts. Such a tribunal must
also take into account the inclinations of what has been regarded as the Third
World. Of particular concern must be the attitude of the emerging nations
as to the use of force to fight colonialism and to protect kith and kin.5
In making a judicial determination, such a tribunal must consider the
type of conflict involved. There may be a direct and massive use of military
51 MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 1954 BR. YEAR BOOK
INT'L L. 293.
52 See generally J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 10-13 (1958). Article 2(4)
of the Charter, which is the cornerstone, explicitly provides that "all members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose
of the United Nations." However, article 51 recognizes an inherent right of self-defense.
53 Dugard, The Organisation of African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry Into the
Plea of Self-Defence As a justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism,
16 INT'L Comp. L. Q. 157 (1967). What such a tribunal will be able to accomplish is quite
limited. "[W]orld public opinion is 'color coded.' Its reactions are conditioned by differing
historical and psychological perceptions of concepts like 'democracy,' 'self determination,'
'liberation,' 'colonialism,' and 'imperialism.'" Glick, The United Nations: Uses and Abuses,
CONGRESS BI-WE rLY, Sept. 25, 1967, at 11. However, the same writer admits it is the
task of democracies to justify its actions before such a tribunal.
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force by one political entity across the frontier of another as in Korea or at
Suez in 1956 and 1967, or a substantial military participation by one or more
foreign nations in an internal struggle for political control, such as the Spanish
Civil War, or an internal struggle for control of a national society, the outcome
of which is independent of external participation, such as Hungary prior to
Soviet intervention."4
If the analysis of the principle of universal jurisdiction given above is
correct, the basis for a permanent ad hoc tribunal already exists. No new
treaties or negotiations would be required to establish it, though they might be
desirable to solemnize the court's birth and to reaffirm world belief in its task.
Nor does it strain the proper construction of the resolutions we have discussed
to regard them as demonstrating a fundamental agreement on the right of all
humanity to punish crimes against humanity. All international law is a matter
of deriving indications as to the will of nations from their acts, scrutinizing
verbal and physical manifestations to discover what rights and obligations
nations think themselves to possess." Full consideration should be given to
resolutions carried unanimously in the General Assembly of the United Nations
as indicative of the opinions of states. Though the contention has been put forth
that the proposal for such a tribunal presupposes the existence of universal prin-
ciples or a natural law that does not exist,-" the tribunal could express those
principles derived from the shared values of the world community as expressed
by international decision-makers and the recognized claims of states. These
shared values would constitute the norms for such an international tribunal."
Through the United Nations Charter, the Nuremberg Charter and verdict,
and other significant manifestations of authority, the general community of
mankind has established a basic distinction between permissible and imper-
missible use of violence with authoritative prohibition of impermissible coercion.
In essence, this new principle seeks to preclude all deliberate use of violence,
other than by agents of the international community, as an instrument of policy
between peoples. It seeks to prevent attacks upon the territorial integrity and
political independence of people and to preclude threats of violence that may
put their targets under such apprehension that they must use military instru-
ments to defend their territorial integrity and independence.",
The existing judicial apparatus of the United Nations is not fitted to the
task here proposed. The International Court of Justice is limited by chapter
III, article 34, section I of its statute in the following manner: "Only states
may be parties to cases before the Court." This, of course, is inadequate. One
of the immediate functions to be performed by a war crimes tribunal would be
the removal of any taint of illegality from all future trials of the Eichmann sort.
Furthermore, trials of war criminals are, above all, trials of individuals. There
54 Falk, International Law and the United States Role in The Viet Nam War, 75 YALE,
L. J. 1122, 1126 (1966).
55 MacGibbon, note 51 supra.
56 Note, War Crimes Trial: ,4 Second Look, 24 U. PITT. L. REv. 132 (1962).
57 See Generally M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER
(1961).
58 M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORMD ORDER 107 (1967).
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is much to be said for the existence of a forum in which a threatened state can
judicially challenge the aggressor, but the enforcement of sanctions against the
guilty party in such cases is quite difficult. The international tribunal that
punishes war crimes must spread a doctrine of individual liability if it is to
have any deterrent effect upon those natural persons, often in quite petty
capacities, in whose hands the capacity to commit war crimes lies.
The tribunals contemplated by the Versailles Treaty and the Nuremberg
Charter were to be composed of one judge each from a stated number of nations.
To some extent the General Assembly also functions on a basis of equal repre-
sentation so that logically a court intended to represent the condemnation of
mankind should have behind it as wide a geographical distribution as possible.
At the same time, the Charter of the United Nations does recognize certain
disparities in the distribution of power among states and balances the egalitarian-
ism of the General Assembly with veto powers in the Security Council. If it were
felt desirable that the tribunal's judiciary reflect not merely the balance of
opinion but also the balance of power, it might be arranged that they be drawn
from among some smaller group of nations, such as the permanent members
of the Security Council. Chapter VI, article 33 of the United Nations Charter
binds the member nations who are parties to any dispute to first seek a solution
by judicial settlement, regional arrangements or agencies, or "any other peace-
ful means of their own choice." Moreover, the Security Council is provided
with the power to call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means.
Article 36 requires the Security Council to refer judicial disputes to the Inter-
national Court of Justice "as a general rule." Article 34 gives the Council (or
presumably any such agency as it may create as its representative) the power
to investigate disputes, and the power to make recommendations upon the
result of those investigations. Here is a court in everything but name.
The Security Council is, as originally contemplated by the Charter, the
agency chiefly responsible for the deterrence of the use of force in world affairs.
Nothing in the Charter prevents the Council from reserving to itself that special
class of disputes involving the commission of war crimes, the extradition of the
criminals, and the recommendation of appropriate punishment. It might be
held, however, that such action is blocked by the language "means of their
own choice." If this language is construed to modify all previous terms ("judicial
settlement," "regional arrangements," etc.), then it might imply a veto in the
hands of the potential defendants. But if it is construed merely as an alterna-
tive to "settlement," no such veto arises. Here it is necessary to consider the
purpose of the Council as a whole. The Charter does not simply create a medi-
ator among states. It contemplates creating a power for the purposes of keep-
ing the peace. Thus, a permanent tribunal is compatible with the Charter of
the United Nations. It is suggested, however, that the problems of war crimes
indictment might best be handled by a body that has behind it a more imme-
diate background of political power than does the International Court of'
Justice.
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V. Summary and Conclusion
This proposal is not utopian in its implications. Such a tribunal would
be acceptable to the United States Senate if it were limited only to making
determinations without having the means for enforcement,59 a conception that
may be acceptable to other states as well. Such a tribunal would contribute
to international order by clarifying the norms of the world community as applied
to particular cases. After making such determinations, reference would then
be made to the political organs of the United Nations.
Generally, the enforcement of judicial decrees has not been considered a
part of the judicial process. When a national court enforces a decree, it does
so in its administrative rather than its judicial capacity. Where suits are insti-
tuted against the state or its autonomous subdivisions, enforcement is under-
taken not by the judicial body that rendered the decision, but by separate
legislative or administrative proceedings. The only function of the court is to
determine the abstract question of liability or the merits of the particular case.
This principle applies a fortiori to proceedings between states in international
tribunals, both arbitral and judicial. The enforcement process could neither
be undertaken nor directed by the international tribunal. Its judgments would
be purely declaratory. The distinguishing feature of an international tribunal is
that it does not have the means for enforcement, while a national court acts
for and in the name of a sovereign entity -a concept entirely absent in the
idea of an international tribunal.
0
The enforcement of decrees of an international tribunal is political. Under
the United Nations Charter, enforcement may be undertaken by the Security
Council. 1 Generally, however, coercion to compel involuntary compliance
with the decrees of international tribunals is an exceptional and rarely required
remedy. Similar considerations would apply to the enforcement of the decisions
of a war crimes tribunal. Where a state refuses to adhere to a determination by
the tribunal, it would be subjected to the censure of public opinion. Enforce-
ment may be undertaken by the appropriate regional organization, if it is func-
tioning, or by application of sanctions pursuant to the United Nations Charter.
States committed to the principle of world order, or who find such commitment
to be in their national interest, could induce a recalcitrant state to comply.
Clearly, the establishment of a war crimes tribunal would reflect inter-
national realities. States would retain their sovereignty, although it would be
somewhat limited. States have already limited their sovereignty by renouncing
the use of force to resolve international disputes when they signed the United
Nations Charter. The nineteenth-century notions of absolute sovereignty can
no longer prevail in the contemporary world community. As one commentator
has observed:
In effect, what has occurred is a mass exchange of hostages, leaving
59 Rosenberg, Bratum Fulmen: A Precedent for a World Court, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 783
(1925).
60 Deutsch, Problems of Enforcement of Decrees of International Tribunals, 50 A.B.A.J.
1134 (1964).
61 U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
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the population of the world's major cities subject to sudden slaughter by
hostile governments. This is interdependence on a new plane of intensity:
to an unbelievable and gruesome degree we now depend on each other's
leaders to be rational, to be predictable, to be sane. One has only to imagine
for a moment what the situation would be like today if Hitler and the
Nazi Party were in charge of a military force like that of the U.S. or the
U.S.S.R. to appreciate how desperately we depend on each other's leaders
to be relatively free of paranoia, and endowed with humane qualities.0 2
Impartial judges could be found for an international war crimes tribunal.
Despite subjectivity and psychological factors, judicial decision-makers are ca-
pable of rendering impartial decisions. Problems do exist, however, such as en-
vironmental and cultural backgrounds. A judge could be precluded from de-
ciding a matter in which his nation has a primary interest. Another approach
might be the idea of chambers, of referring disputes to a group of neutral
judges. Where judges are to be disqualified, it may also be necessary to dis-
qualify a judge allied with the state affected. An active recruitment program
should be instituted to recruit unbiased decision-makers. Selection of judges
should be made from a number of sources, so that no judge will feel he owes
his position because of selection from one source. One model might be selection
by means of an international commission with approval from the candidate's
government and from the General Assembly.
The notion of adherence to law and the judicial tradition will tend to in-
culcate objectivity." Studies of the behavior of international tribunals do in-
dicate objectivity.64 Judges on the International Court of Justice and its pre-
decessor, the Permanent Court, have on numerous occasions deviated from the
interests of their home countries in rendering decisions.6" The incidence for
such deviation is considerably less where ad hoc judges are selected.66 Some
studies have also noted that ideological lines are often blurred as socialists join
with nonsocialist coalitions in deciding issues, and no evidence indicates a con-
sistent bias that separates either the developed or underdeveloped or the major
or minor powers, though such a distinction did exist in the recent Southwest
African decision. 7 Judges would do well to examine themselves for bias, and
provision should be made for conflict of interest and recusancy.6"
Cases should be referred to such a tribunal with caution. The proposed
war crimes tribunal would be but one mechanism for the resolution of conflict.
The resolution of a particular conflict may be best resolved through negotiation
and mediation rather than through submission to a tribunal to determine which
party is just. Indeed, in some instances, the finding that one party is criminal
may actually create psychological blocks to prevent a resolution. However,
62 Benoit, Interdependence on a Small Planet, 1 COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus. 9, 10 (1966),
in 112 CONG. Rc. 9014 (daily ed. May 2, 1966).
63 Franck, Some Psychological Factors in International Third Party Decision Making, 19
STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1967).
64 Id. at 1220.
65 Id. at 1221.
66 See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF
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where a party commits, or threatens to commit, an act of aggression and re-
fuses to seek a peaceful accommodation of an issue - such as the resolution
of the Arab states to destroy Israel as the only solution 9 - referral to a war
crimes tribunal would become imperative.
Clearly, an initial problem to be determined is the extent to which cold war
issues - matters involving confrontation between the Western and Soviet blocs
- should be referred to such a tribunal for determination. Ritualistically, Ameri-
can political leaders have asserted the rights of the captive nations - those
states situated east of the Oder-Niese River upon whom Communist regimes
were imposed in the course of occupation by the Red Army following World
War II.7" Concern for the fate of these peoples became especially acute following
the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution through the deployment of
Red Army troops." This Communist domination, though somewhat eased
today, stands in violation of notions of the national right of self-determination
and the norms of the United Nations Charter. The problem of these countries,
however, requires an understanding of history. The territory of the Soviet Union
had been invaded twice in the twentieth century from the frontiers on which
these states are situated. Between the wars all these states, with the exception of
Czechoslovakia, had dictatorial regimes that were hostile to the Soviet Union,
and some of these regimes even collaborated with the Axis powers. Stalin had,
even during the war, asserted the need for having friendly governments in these
states and made clear that hostile regimes would not be tolerated. 2 The agree-
ments entered into by the Allies were informal and unclear.
A war crimes tribunal would need to take all these factors into account
in rendering any decision. Moreover, it would have to consider the impact of
its decision upon the relationship between the bipolar blocs. It is doubtful
whether a determination unfavorable to the Soviet Union would have any
practical effect. Because of what it considers as its security interests, the Soviet
Union will not loosen its hold upon these nations, except perhaps through an
evolutionary process of permitting these governments to assert greater inde-
pendence. On the other hand, a determination favorable to the Soviet Union
may cause frustration for those who seek the national aspiration of these peoples.
The Western Powers and the Soviet Union have, in effect, accepted the principle
of co-existence, which has meant a de facto acceptance of the status quo in
Eastern Europe. Any change in this situation can only be resolved through
diplomatic negotiation and mutual settlement by the two super powers rather
than through the resort to legal rostrums.7
On the other hand, the war crimes tribunal could make objective determi-
69 Hourani, supra note 11.
70 Examples of Captive Nations Week declarations are presented in 113 CONG. REc.
H13419 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1967).
71 The Hungarian Revolution, 13 WORLD TODAY 3, 13-14 (1957).
72 See generally H. FEIS, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN: TEE WAR THEY WAGED
AND THE PEACE THEY SOUGHT (1957); H. FEIs, BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE POTSDAM
CONFERENCE (1960); W. McNEILL, AMERICA, BRITAIN AND RUSSIA: THEIR COOPERATION
AND CONFLICT (1953); Lynd, How the Cold War Began, 30 COMMENTARY 379 (1960).
73 Different perspectives on Russian intentions and the nature of the cold war are
presented in THE COLD WAR (Graebner ed. 1963).
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nations with regard to wars of liberation, as in Viet Nam and perhaps in
Thailand. The tribunal could find, after objectively considering all the facts,
the extent to which a particular armed conflict is an internal insurgency as
opposed to an external intervention. Such a determination could be made with
regard to alleged Cuban interventions in the Western Hemisphere.
A war crimes tribunal could also determine whether the actions of the
Soviet Union against the Jews and other national groups constitute genocide."'
The pressure of public opinion from such a determination may induce a modi-
fication of Soviet policy. But such efforts must be limited within the context
of particular situations, and radical change cannot be expected.
A war crimes tribunal could be particularly appropriate in focusing upon
the genocidal actions committed by the People's Republic of China in Tibet in
breaking up families and preventing marriages.7 5 Nationalist China also may
be condemned for its reported acts of suppression on Taiwan. Though represent-
ing less than 20 percent of the total population, Chiang Kai-shek and his main-
land cohorts have kept a rigid and sometimes ruthless upper hand over the Tai-
wanese who have been subjected to frequent intimidation and humiliation. Fol-
lowing an uprising in reaction to Nationalist oppression, 10,000 Taiwanese were
killed in 1947 as the Nationalist regime contrived to keep the Taiwanese generally
in a state of subjection and to remove from the scene all leaders and potential
leaders of the Taiwanese opposition. The Taiwanese are denied the right to par-
ticipate in the government. Significantly, Taiwanese feel that their only recourse
is to appeal to outsiders who may be in a position to influence opinion outside
Taiwan to an extent where it will affect the Nationalist regime. 6 In such a situa-
tion a determination by a war crimes tribunal might have particularly salutary
effect.
The war crimes tribunal would play a special role within the context of
disarmament. A case may be made that under existing treaty law - the Charter
of the United Nations, the Nuremberg Charter and the Kellogg-Briand Pact
of 1928 - the excessive production of armaments with an overkill capacity is
illegal. In the existing international legal order, an excessive measure of
armament constitutes a permanent threat to peace. Rearmament beyond what
is required for an effective second strike capacity may raise the presumption of
preparation for aggressive war. 9 States, by joining the United Nations, may
have accepted an obligation to enter into a disarmament treaty." Conceivably,
74 Wohl, Reds Spar with Jews in Russia, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 12, 1967,
at 9. Ukrainians in exile claim that their co-nationals in the Soviet Union are subject to
oppression and genocide and claim a struggle for independence is taking place. See advertise-
ment for World Congress of Free Ukrainians, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1967, at 51.
75 INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE
WRONGS OF STATES, A SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES 1964-5, at 9.
76 Fitzgerald, Taiwan for the Taiwanese, ATLAS, Nov., 1967, at 36.
77 Esgain, The Legal Aspects of Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties, 38 TEMPLE
L. Q. 133 (1965).
78 Id. at 134.
79 I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 196 (1963).
Brownlie notes, however, that the Nuremberg Tribunal held that the mere policy of rearma-
ment is not criminal even if one were in a position to know that the only object consistent
with such rearmament was war.
80 Esgain, supra note 77, at 135.
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a non-aligned state could seek a determination from the war crimes tribunal as
to the legality of the big powers arms race or of the particular policies of one
of the powers. For example, the legality of the Soviet Union's development of
a suborbital bomb or the United States' development of an anti-ballistic missile
may be challenged. A ruling could be made with respect to the interpretation
of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." The omission of a provision for third party
adjudication provides an unfortunate legal precedent and the danger of ad-
herence to an outdated and incompatible doctrine of state sovereignty. 2
In order to assure compliance, arms control and disarmament treaties
should expressly adopt the principle of universal jurisdiction over individuals
whose acts or omissions constitute breaches of their provisions. Penal and pro-
cedural codes of universal application should be adopted. Accessories before
and after the fact and attempts to commit offenses that are prohibited by the
treaty should be punished by its provisions. Such provisions may not be too
difficult to negotiate. The Soviet Union took the position that violations of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be nothing more heinous than negligent acts or
omissions of subordinate personnel, that offenses under the Treaty would not
be inspired by governments and, generally, that they would be contrary to the
policies of state involved and, as such, readily punished by it. The United States
position has been that the most important violations that are likely to occur
would be government directed, especially in the case of the Soviet Union."
A war crimes tribunal would play a special role within the context of such
a situation. Though violators would be subject to the jurisdiction of municipal
authorities, they would also be required to answer for their actions before an
international tribunal. The tribunal would make a determination as to guilt
and mete out punishment. With disarmament, war will be eliminated as an
instrument of national policy and law would become the means for resolving
disputes. A war crimes tribunal would play a crucial role. In a disarmed world,
decisions of a war crimes tribunal could be enforced by the creative application
of principles of nonviolence as suggested by the experience of Gandhi and the
civil rights struggle in the United States. 4
The implementation and application of a war crimes tribunal require serious
thought and study. The focus must be upon the behavior of man - his capacity
for self-delusion in justifying violence and his propensity to bully and torture a
defenseless victim. It is necessary to observe the way in which men actually
behave and the forces that have changed their behavior and then, reasoning
from such observations as to what a human being really is, determine how
further changes might be effected. This requires the application of the social
sciences, particularly psychology.
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At traditional international law, the punishment of war crimes was in the
hands of states and jurisdiction was founded on the principles of nationality
of the defendant and protective jurisdiction over offenses committed against
one's own nationals. Individuals were thought not to be triable, and universal
jurisdiction was thought to lie, if in any case, only for piracy. However, in a
series of steps chiefly associated with this century's great wars, these doctrines
have been modified. At the present tine, individuals are the chief subjects of
the international law of war crimes. Universal jurisdiction, by consent of the
chief nations, is said to lie against the crimes enumerated in the resolutions by
the General Assembly of the United Nations condemning war crimes and geno-
cide. This general consent forms the legal basis for a permanent ad hoc war
crimes tribunal for the punishment of war crimes and genocide. Only by focus-
ing the spotlight of international publicity can outrages to international order
be averted.
